Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Rules for coordinating the fi nancial relationship among different government levels have the purpose of guaranteeing both macroeconomic stability and fi nancial sustainability. Fiscal rules are generally justifi ed because they act as a substitute for reputation when government policy is discretionary and time-inconsistent. Poterba (1996) compares the "institutional irrelevance view", where budget rules can be circumvented, with the "public choice view", where fi scal institutions represent important constraints on the behaviour of political actors, suggesting the predominance of the latter.
The European Stability and Growth Pact, adopted in 1997, is a set of rules designed, among other goals, to ensure sound public fi nances. 1 In order to be compliant with the Stability and Growth Pact, member states can implement subnational fi scal rules, imposing fi scal discipline on subnational governments. For instance, in 1999 the Italian government implemented subnational fi scal rules under the so-called Domestic Stability Pact (hereafter DSP) to coordinate and control subnational budget balances. In contrast to the attitude to national fi scal rules, there has been a controversial debate about the necessity of subnational rules. Authors such as Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996) , Rodden (2002) and Rodden (2004) are in favour of these rules, arguing that the scope for subnational fi scal rules is higher when there are severe fi scal imbalances, possibly exacerbated by the decentralization process. In fact, when more functions are delegated to local governments, their spending power rises, and imbalances may worsen. In addition, local governments have incentives to free-ride on fi scal discipline because they can rely on a common pool of national resources (Weingast, 2009) or they are "too big to fail" (Wildasin, 1997) . On the other hand, Milesi-Ferretti (2004) argues against sub national fi scal rules, suggesting that local rules might lead to "ugly outcomes" for local governments, such as creative accounting and window dressing. TerMinassian (2007) affi rms that fi scal rules should only be implemented when fi nan-cial markets and cooperative arrangements across government levels cannot reach fi nancial discipline.
Fiscal rules may also be implemented to foster virtuous behaviour. Dovis and Kirpalani (2017) investigate whether subnational fi scal rules correct the local incentives to over-borrow, due to their expectations of bailouts by central governments. They suggest that fi scal rules can be welfare-reducing if the reputation of the central government is low enough, leading to even more debt accumulation. Debrun et al. (2008) suggest that certain rules, such as those targeting the budget balance or general government debt, have a signifi cant effect on defi cits, but expenditure rules do not by themselves have a signifi cant impact on budget balances. In a survey of recent studies, Wyplosz (2012) fi nds that fi scal rules are often too easily dismissed when they are in confl ict with political goals. However, Glaeser (2013) shows that fi scal rules at the local level are more likely to be observed than rules at the level of the national government. Poterba (1994) studies the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s, pointing out that more restrictive state fi scal rules, such as "no-defi cit-carryover" rules and tax and expenditure limitations, are linked to faster fi scal adjustment to unexpected defi cits. Heinemann, Moessinger and Yeter (2018), using a meta regression analysis on 30 studies, fi nd that there is a consensus that fi scal rules infl uence fi scal aggregates, particularly for defi cits but less for debt, expenditures and revenues.
In relation to the compositional consequences of fi scal rules for public budgets, Foremny (2014) examines EU15 regional and local governments over the period 1995-2008. They suggest that subnational fi scal rules are effective in unitary countries, specifi cally in limiting defi cits and large debts, while there is no clear evidence in federal countries, due to the larger legal fi scal autonomy. The fact that subnational fi scal rules reduce public defi cits is also found by Burret and Feld (2018) in the case of Swiss cantons, while Bergman, Hutchison and Jensen (2016) show that fi scal rules foster sound public fi nances in a panel of EU countries. Grisorio and Prota (2015) study Italian regional administrations over the period 1996-2008 and show that an increase in fi scal decentralization affects public expenditure composition, specifi cally through a reduction in the share of capital to total expenditure. The aim of this paper is to assess empirically the extent to which fi scal spending rules are able to affect local behaviour, and for this purpose the specifi c features of the DSP allows for implementing a natural-experiment strategy through a difference-in-discontinuity analysis. More specifi cally, this work targets two main research questions: 1) Are fi scal rules able to do what they are supposed to do? If the central government is able to enforce the subnational rules, the answer should be positive and not really surprising, considering that the legal design is confi rmed. Nevertheless, a positive answer would support the fi nding that subnational fi scal rules are effective.
2) Are budget items equally affected by fi scal rules? For instance, in the event of a budget cut, a local government could decide to focus the budget reduction not on all budget expenses proportionally, but only on specifi c items. Other authors focus on the impact of fi scal rules on the ability of local administrations to achieve fi scal discipline and sustainability. In particular, Balduzzi and Grembi (2011) check whether the adoption of fi scal rules has been accompanied by an increase in window dressing as measured through the level of budget fi scal residuals, without fi nding a variation in the level of budget residuals connected to the adoption of the DSP. Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano (2016) analyse Italian municipalities between 1999 and 2004, implementing a difference-in-discontinuities approach. They show highlight that relaxing fi scal rules increases defi cits and lowers taxes, generating a defi cit bias from zero to 2% of the total budget. This variation is mainly driven by adjustment on the revenue side.
The contribution of this paper is twofold, underlined by the two research questions. Firstly, in relation to the fi rst question and in line with the literature on the effectiveness of fi scal rules, it confi rms that fi scal rules are effective. In particular, there is evidence that when fi scal rules that impose a reduction in consumption and an increase in investment simultaneously, budget expenses react accordingly.
In relation to the second question, results show that: (a) when the fi scal rule imposes a reduction in current spending, not all items are equally affected and the most penalized is spending on services. This evidence shows that current spending is composed of different items, and a general rule that imposes a drop in spending may affect only a specifi c subcategory. Therefore, policy-makers may consider not targeting current spending with fi scal rules in general, but specifi c subcategories of current spending in a case in which a certain behaviour from local government is required. For instance, the central government could induce local authorities to decrease current spending by lowering wage expenses, while maintaining the service levels and keeping expenditures constant; (b) when the fi scal rule allows for an increase in capital spending, there actually is an increase in spending on infrastructure and in local public debt. This result is not surprising because of the so-called "golden rule", which states that debt can be used to fi nance only investment. The link between an increase in investment and debt is therefore not surprising. However, the increase in public debt could be an unwanted outcome that goes beyond the initial willingness of the policy-maker, which possibly aimed to decrease current spending in favour of capital spending, but without the intention to increase public debt. In this case, the policy-maker could design fi scal rules that directly target subcategories of budget items able to foster the desired local behaviour, possibly also limiting the use of debt to fi nance investment.
As the focus is mainly on economic explanatory variables, this study is not related to the vast amount of political economy research on local public fi nance.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the normative framework of local Italian budget rules, while section 3 focuses on the theoretical background. Section 4 illustrates the empirical analysis and results and section 5 concludes.
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
Italian municipalities are subject to the Law for Local Authorities, 2 in which the goals and duties of local government are stated. Moreover, starting from 1999, the central government imposed the DSP to honour commitments taken with European Institutions. 3 Since its introduction, the DSP has implemented different types of rules, such as: (a) a balanced budget, whereby the total amount of revenue has to be equal to the total amount of expenditure; (b) expenditure caps, through which there might be ceilings on total current expenditure or specifi c expenditure items; (c) ceilings on revenue, which enable the central government to limit local authorities' ability to increase revenue; (d) limits on the stock of debt or the issuance of new loans; (e) restrictions on the type of expenditure that can be funded by debt (the so-called "golden rule" stating that new loans can fi nance only capital investments); (f) indicators of the ability to service the debt.
Among Italian municipalities, the amount of consumption (current) compared to investment (capital) spending has changed over time. As shown in fi gure 1, the overall consumption over GDP of municipalities was 3.96% in 1990, whilst investment was 2.47%. The distance between these two types of spending decreased in the following years: in 2005, consumption and investment over GDP reached 3.32% and 3.01% respectively. However, from 2006 onwards, whilst consumption remained stable, investment constantly decreased, falling to 1.62% in 2010. 4 2 Law no. 367/2000. In particular, the specific functions are presented by the 167/1996 Presidential Decree and cover a wide range of subjects, such as general administration, justice, local police, state education (up to primary school and part of secondary school), culture, sport, tourism, local public transportation, urban development, social sector, economic development, productive local services. 3 As stated in the introduction, the Stability and Growth Pact was adopted to ensure that EU countries pursue sound public fi nances, also controlling public spending at both the central and local level. Different types of public spending are able to generate dissimilar effects on the economy. Ganelli and Tervala (2010) state that the reallocation of consumption in favour of investment spending might generate welfare gains. Acconcia, Corsetti and Simonelli (2014) show that in Italy local investment spending on infrastructure has a multiplier of 1.5 on impact and 1.9 in the medium term.
Consequently, there could be an incentive by the central authority to direct local spending more towards investment. Is this goal achieved through the domestic stability pact? Since its introduction, the pact has been revised yearly. In fact, the representatives of local governments bargain each year with the central government about the way in which the pact should be designed. On the one hand, there are local needs to be addressed and, on the other hand, national and macroeconomic circumstances that the central government has to address. The outcome is that since 1999 there have been many changes. During the fi rst years, all local governments were subject to the pact, while since 2002 municipalities under a certain threshold were exempt and special rules have been applied to the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano and to the special-statute regions. 5 In the fi rst two years of its application (i.e. 1999 and 2000), the Pact required a decrease of the aggregate defi cit on a current programmes basis. From 2001 to 2006, the rule targeted the budget balance, which has to be corrected from one year to the other, also imposing limits, expressed as a ceiling with respect to historical values, on the growth rate of current expenditure. TO Interestingly, in 2005 and 2006 the central government devoted specifi c attention to local public spending through the DSP. The national government had to control the overall growth of general government spending and the Pact was modifi ed, imposing a constraint on subnational expenditure, defi ned by a ceiling on the spending growth rate. Unlike in the previous period, for the fi rst time the limit also included capital spending. Indeed, in 2005, a cap was set on total expenditures, which could not be higher than the average spending of the previous three years augmented by 11.5%. 6 In 2006, the limit on overall spending was removed, while different ceilings on current and capital expenditures were added. Consumption was penalized, because the rule imposed a cut of 6.5% on current spending, while investment could increase by 8.1%. 7 Before, the main target rule was based on the fi scal gap, 8 while from 2007 the main constraint was on a target balance calculated on both a cash and an accrual basis. 9 The number of municipalities subject to the pact has changed since the introduction of the DSP: during the fi rst two years, all municipalities were subject to the DSP, while since 2001 those with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants have been exempt. 10 In order to study the effect of fi scal spending rules, the analysis focuses on the period 2004-2006, as summarised in table 1, comparing municipalities subject to the DSP with those that are exempt. As shown in fi gure 2, from 2005 to 2006, municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants (Group B) slightly decreased the consumption over investment ratio (from 1.75 to 1.73), while an upward trend is found for Group A (from 1.50 to 1.76). This may be due to a budget composition effect caused by the DSP. This normative framework provides an opportunity to study the extent to which fi scal rules can affect budget spending decisions at a local level through a natural experiment, as further detailed in the following section.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The institutional framework analysed in section 3 shows that decisions related to the DSP are made by the central government and are therefore exogenous with respect to local dynamics. Considering that municipalities up to 5,000 inhabitants (Group A) are not subject to the DSP, they will form the control group, while the treated group includes municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants (Group B). The treatment is the fi scal rule variation imposed by the DSP and the cut-off is the population level at 5,000 inhabitants.
To assess the causal effect of each fi scal rule (the treatment) on the treated group, it is necessary to consider a minimum set of assumptions with which to perform the analysis (Angrist and Pischke, 1996) . Potential budget outcomes Y are the variables of interest and the actual treatment D depends on the variable Z, which is equal to 1 when a municipality is assigned to the treatment, while Z=0 when it is assigned to the control group. The potential budget outcome of municipality m at time t depends on Z and D, which can more formally be expressed as
. Therefore, the outcome Y mt (1) is when the municipality is treated and Y mt (0) otherwise. The following assumptions should be considered: 1) Stable unit treatment value assumption. The potential outcomes and treatments of unit m are independent of the potential assignment, treatments and outcomes of n ≠ m. Consequently, a municipality subject to the treatment should not infl uence the others (no general equilibrium effects). TO 2) Non-zero average causal effect of Z on D. The probability of treatment must be different between the two groups. Therefore, it is required that whoever is assigned to the treatment actually gets the treatment, or at least part of the component of the treated group. In other words, some level of compliance is necessary.
3) The exclusion restriction should hold. Consequently, the assignment only affects the outcome through the treatment. 4) Monotonicity. No one does the opposite of its assignment, regardless what the assignment is. Thus, the absence of defi ers is required. Specifi cally, a defi er would be a municipality that follows the DSP rules without any formal obligation. 5) Random assignment. All municipalities have the same probability of getting the treatment.
It should be noted that assumption (5) cannot hold due to the fact that the assignment is not random, but rather conditioned to the population level. In this case, a sharp regression discontinuity design (SRDD) could be implemented, imposing the following assumptions: 6) Assignment to treatment must only depend on observable pre-intervention variables (i.e. the population level). 7) Identifi cation of the mean treatment effect is only possible at the threshold. 8) The continuity of potential outcomes. Limits of the expected values have to be identical at the cut-off. In other words, the budget outcomes of municipalities just before and after the cut-off level should be equal.
Under these assumptions, the SRDD can be written as (Angrist and Pischke, 2008):
where P c is the population at the cut-off level, δ represents a small number, Y m and P m are the potential budget outcome and population of municipality m. The estimand of this nonparametric estimation strategy is the average causal effect, .
However, assumption (8) raises some issues. In order to identify the causal effect at the cut-off point, any discontinuity in the relationship between the outcome of interest and the variable determining the treatment status must be fully attributable to the treatment itself. However, there is a confounding discontinuity policy at the cut-offs, due to a change in the wage level of local politicians. In fact, the two groups of municipalities guarantee different wages in relation to the population level, with a jump at 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants (exactly at the cut-offs). As shown by Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), better-paid politicians are able to improve internal effi ciency, sizing down the government. Consequently, there is a confounding policy that might alter the identifi cation strategy. To overcome this issue, the approach described in the following subsection can be implemented.
DIFFERENCE-IN-DISCONTINUITIES
The confounding policy that inhibits the effectiveness of the SRDD strategy is constant over the analysed period. In order to remove the constant confounding discontinuity (i.e. different wage policies among municipalities), we can combine the difference-in-difference strategy with a regression discontinuity design, implementing a difference-in-discontinuities (DiDisc) framework (Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano, 2016). 11 The assumptions that should hold are as follows: 9) The confounding discontinuity needs to be time invariant. This assumption requires that the effect of wage variations on budget outcomes among groups not vary with time. 10) The interaction between the treatment and the confounding discontinuity has to be irrelevant. Therefore, different wage policies should not generate a different reaction than the fi scal rules introduced by the DSP.
Under these assumptions, there is an estimator, the DiDisc estimator δ̂0, that identifi es the local treatment effect δ 0 :
where Y mt is the potential budget outcome for municipality m at time t, P m is the population level, t 1 is the year of the treatment and t 0 is the previous one. For each case, the assignment to the treatment is given by the dummy D mt which takes the value:
where P c is the cut-off level. Having described the DiDisc strategy, we can now proceed with the empirical analysis. Municipalities in provinces and regions with "special autonomy" cannot be included in the analysis. In fact, subnational governments with "special autonomy" have the power to bargain fi scal rules directly with the Central Government. Consequently, municipalities of the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano and the autonomous regions of Sic-ily, Sardinia, Aosta Valley, Trentino-Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia are excluded from the sample. Presumably, small and large municipalities might exhibit different behaviours in terms of budget policies and therefore a specifi c distance from the cut-off level (5,000 inhabitants, as detailed in the next subsection) is imposed (d = 2,000). 13 Consequently, the municipalities included are those between 3,000 and 7,000 inhabitants. Summary statistics are reported in table 2. 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The "local linear regression" (LLR) model may be used to estimate the DiDisc estimator, as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) , which fi ts the data with linear regression functions in a specifi c sample range. The interval is limited, considering a distance d from the cut-off point, thus
. The estimated model is: (3) where Y mt is the budget outcome for municipality m at time t, is the normalized population size, with , G being a dummy equal to 1 when a municipality is part of the treated group and 0 otherwise, t 1 is the treatment year. X is a vector of time-invariant controls (i.e. area size, sea level and geographical macroarea) and Z is a vector of time-variant controls (i.e. per-capita GDP, infl ation and unemployment) at the regional level r. 14 and ω are the coeffi cients related to the controls, while α 0 is the intercept and ε is the error term. 15 The assignment to the treatment is given by the dummy D mt = G m t 1 , as explained in the previous subsection. Table 3 shows the main results, where the local treatment effects δ 0 are reported for the relevant budget items.
RESULTS
Case A shows no effects due to the variation in the fi scal rule from budget balance to total expenditure cap. The latter rule does not affect budget composition (columns 1-3), as expected. In fact, considering that this rule allows for an increase in the overall spending, a difference in the budget composition would have been a surprise. This result is also confi rmed by the visual. Figure 3 graphically shows the difference-in-discontinuities for consumption and investment in Case A (upper fi gures). There is no evidence of different trends between the two groups, suggesting that the fi scal rule variation was not able to affect the budget.
Case B studies the variation of the fi scal rule from total expenditure cap to two different caps, one specifi c for consumption and a different one for investment. As detailed in section 3, the cap on consumption imposes a drop on its spending level, while the investment rule allowed for more capital spending. Local governments faced two major decisions. Firstly, they had to choose which budget item of current spending should be decreased. Secondly, they could decide to increase investments. Considering that the budget data represent the accrual basis of accounting, 14 Both time-invariant and time-variant characteristics are obtained from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat, see: http://www.istat.it/en/). 15 Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level in order to have a sufficient number of municipal units to avoid unreliable standard errors, as it would with clusters at the municipal level (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) . TO [4] [5] [6] show that consumption decreased by 33.40 euro (column 6), which represents about 3% of the total budget. In addition, the current spending item affected is the one related to services. On the other hand, capital spending has been signifi cantly increased by 114.55 euro per capita (about 8% of the overall budget), mainly due to higher infrastructure spending. It should also be noted that there has been an increase in new loans of 62.21 euro per capita (about 4% of total budget), in line with the so called "golden rule", which states that new loans can be taken out only to fi nance investments. Therefore, it is not surprising that infrastructure spending and new loans have the same sign.
However, the fact that fi scal rules designed to increase investment also lead to an increase in debt could be beyond the initial goal of the policy-maker. In fact, a higher debt level could be seen as a threat to overall macroeconomic stability, specifi cally in a country where the general government debt is already particularly high, as in the Italian case. Figure 3 gives the visual evidence for Case B (lower fi gures), highlighting a drop in consumption and an increase in investment for the treated group (right-hand side of fi gures c and d), due to the variation in the DSP rule. Deepening the analysis, fi gure 4 shows the effect on the specifi c budget items for case B. The lower consumption level is generated by a decrease in spending on services, while investment increases due to higher infrastructure spending. On the revenue side of the budget, there is also an increase on the new loans level with respect to the control group.
TABLE 3 Effects of the Domestic Stability Pact on budget items

FIGURE 3
Difference It is also worth noticing that a substantial portion of current expenditures (around 30%) at the local level is absorbed by civil servants' payrolls (wages). The civil servants' payroll is kept out of the target of the DSP in 2005 and 2006 (Gastaldi and Giurato, 2008) and results confi rm that this item did not react to DSP rule variations.
Considering that current spending is mainly driven by services (around 40%), it is not surprising that they reacted signifi cantly to local fi scal rules. More interestingly, both services and infrastructure spending variations were already implemented in the very short run, denoting a quick budget composition reaction to local rule changes. It may seem unlikely that a newly implemented rule is able to affect the budget in the following year. However, this study considers accrual data of the budget. This approach allows one to consider the moment in which a certain project/budget decision is taken (such as a new investment or a budget cut), which may differ with the moment in which the payment is made (cash data) or the project is actually fi nalized. As a consequence, accrual information is better able than cash data, to detect budget variations due to changes in fi scal rules.
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Results shown in subsection 4.3 and related to Case B are further analysed, performing a series of robustness checks. Firstly, a robustness analysis is performed, implementing a different bandwidth, therefore varying the parameter d. The Local Linear Regression model used imposes a distance from the cut-off point equal to 2,000. The regressions are now performed using a distance equal to 1,500 in order to be closer to the cut-off point. As shown in columns 1 and 2 of table 4, results are confi rmed. Consumption decreases thanks to a decrease in spending on services, while both infrastructure spending and new loans increase.
Secondly, the empirical analysis is repeated with a different model, specifi cally the spline polynomial approximation (SPA). This approach relaxes the linearity assumption of the previous method and uses polynomial functions of order 2 to draw the relationship between budget values and the population level. The estimated model is: (4) where the variables and the DiDisc estimator are defi ned as in the LLR method. Columns 3 and 4 of table 4 show that the DSP effects are in line with the previous fi ndings. Furthermore, it could be affi rmed that mayors of treated municipalities have an incentive to manipulate the population size in order to be below the cut-off point for DSP exemption. Considering that fi scal rules are decided year by year at national level (and generally in the last quarter of the year), the anticipation behaviour (i.e. the local government could not counter-react to a decrease in the population level) cannot be implemented. In addition, given that moving from above to below 5,000 inhabitants would lead to a drop in local government wages and that the threshold under which municipalities are exempted by the pact may vary, anticipation effects are discouraged. Figure 5 shows the density level in t 2 , t 3 , and the density variation between the two periods. There is no evidence of a different pattern between control and treated groups, supporting the absence of manipulation behaviours. 
FIGURE 5 Density tests
FINAL REMARKS
Coordination rules between state and local government levels are important in order to guarantee overall sound public fi nances. In 1999, under the Stability and Growth Pact, the Italian government implemented the Domestic Stability Pact to coordinate and control subnational public fi nance. This paper studies the effects of the Pact's fi scal rule variations on Italian municipalities' budget composition, performing a natural experiment through a difference-in-discontinuity design.
The novelty of this study stems from the analysis of specifi c fi scal rules designed to infl uence local public spending, in an attempt to answer two main research questions: (1) are the newly introduced fi scal rules able to do what they are supposed to do? (2) within current and capital spending, is there a budget composition effect? In relation to the former, results show that fi scal rules are able to affect budget composition signifi cantly. This result may be seen as an unsurprising outcome, considering that it confi rms that the central government is able to enforce subnational fi scal rules and therefore the legal design is confi rmed. More interestingly, within a specifi c budget category (such as current and capital spending), not all items are equally affected. The reduction in current spending leads to a decrease in services, while an increase in investment generates higher infrastructure spending.
The policy implications are twofold. Firstly, fi scal rules are able to do what they are supposed to do, but within a specifi c budget category (such as current and capital spending) not all items are equally affected. Therefore, if the policy-maker is interested in affecting a specifi c item, the fi scal rule should be even more precise and directly target that item. Secondly, the fact that fi scal rules designed to increase investment also lead to an increase in debt could go beyond the initial goal of the policy-maker. In fact, a higher debt level could be seen as a threat to overall macroeconomic stability, specifi cally in a country in which general government debt is already particularly high, as in the Italian case. Therefore, the policy-maker may consider a fi scal rule able simultaneously to foster the desired local budget behaviour and to limit an increase in public debt.
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